Mania, Depression, and the Future of Theory
by Elizabeth Abel
I take as my text—because I am
one of those critics
who can speculate only via a text—the five propositions that
collectively suggest that critical inquiry, the practice, not the
journal, is both retrenching and expanding, assuming a depressive and
euphoric stance toward the place of the humanities in a posthuman age.
Five potential futures, but only two positions: a
defense of familiar humanistic ground against the pressures of
technology and corporatization and an embrace of the human sciences
reconstituted through, and on equal footing with, their more confident
scientific others. Can these stances be theorized together rather than
apart?
The sequence of propositions traces a course from
retrenchment to expansion, an implicit narrative of progress, but I
will proceed in the opposite direction to propose an alternative set of
relations. For it seems, to start with proposition four, indisputably
the case that “the rapid transformations in contemporary media . . .
are producing new horizons for theoretical investigations in politics,
science, the arts, and religion that go well beyond the resources of
structuralism, poststructuralism, and the ‘theory revolution’ of the
late twentieth century”. The question is not whether these
broader prospects are achievable or desirable, however distant their
horizons and nascent their terms, but whether they necessarily render
previous projects and practices obsolete, whether they exact a
developmental narrative, or whether there are grounds, beyond a weak
pluralism, for accommodating the humanities and posthumanities in a
relation that unsettles the terms of each.
The most obvious vectors across this turf are
interdisciplinary: programs and special journal issues in media
studies, science/technology and literature, and globalization and the
humanities, designed to build new discursive communities. If their goal
is to resist as well as to theorize the spread of global systems of
technology and capital, they would need to reflect on the ways that the
arts and sciences can be deployed in the interests of the local as well
as of the global. Similarly, they would need to reconsider the
diminished status of foreign language and area study programs to insure
a voice for the local in the discourse of the global without succumbing
to the “timidity, back-filling, and (at best) empirical accumulation”
outlined by the first proposal.
An easier and more pervasive instance of the local
that is also a conduit of the social is the resurgence in recent years
of the autobiographical critical voice that talks back to the abstract
voice of theory. It is a return, as various critics have noted both
positively and negatively, to storytelling as a means of building the
public sphere, of finding common ground through the narrative
particular. The first-person genre has opened the discussion to a range
of critical voices that were tongue-tied by the language of theory, an
expansion that in turn has multiplied the entry points for readers.
These narrative circuits may reinforce the intimate nature of the
critical public sphere, but they do not constitute, as the second
proposition contends, a retreat from “social-political engagements”
(which are not infrequently their topic) to an introverted and
individualizing “therapeutic turn,” especially if critical interest in
Lacan is deemed their “major theoretical symptom”.
For if Lacan is either symptom or agent of a
theoretical turn, it is far from the “care of the self” imagined by
this proposition because the French return to Freud explodes any ready
notion of self-care. It also removes the props for identity politics.
Poststructural psychoanalysis has been the key provocation of a turn to
the identity-destabilizing work of the unconscious that, along with an
unlikely ally in historicism, has galvanized the transition from
transparent to unstable, internally divided, and overdetermined
identity categories. The shift from women’s studies to gender studies
charts this passage vividly. The tense debates of the 1980s and 1990s
between feminism and poststructuralism have without much fanfare
yielded to a tacit consensus that, rather than invalidating politically
engaged analysis, psychologically and historically mobile
conceptualizations of gender make intellectual and political alliances
possible across previously hostile discursive terrains. As
self-difference opens the door to other differences, theorizations that
emanate from one racial or sexual or class turf are more likely to
provoke new questions than old accusations from competing grounds. We
are just at the beginning of a generative process that encompasses not
only the particularization that results from historical refinement and
nuancing but also the elaboration of revisionary narratives: what
happens (as Darieck Scott has asked) 1
when the dark
plantation son
retells the story of the primal horde, or when the racial shadow falls
across the mirror stage, or the queer encounters and reforms the
melancholic? Fracturing the subject has also poked holes in the walls
that have divided psychoanalysis and history, launching a potentially
interminable analysis.
This expansive vision does not entail the fantasy
that we can abandon the language of gender or race. These (and other)
identity categories must still be marshalled not only politically in an
era that is likely to witness the dismantling of affirmative action and
Roe v. Wade but also intellectually in a climate that has claimed
postmodern license to level distinctions for sometimes dubious gain. To
take one salient recent example: Michael Cunningham’s siphoning off of
Virginia Woolf’s cultural capital in his novel The Hours. Woolf's death
in the opening scene of the novel and the film is the enabling
condition of The Hours—the
foregrounding of her suicide is a telltale
symptom that this is an act of literary murder and inheritance, masked
in the film by a thin feminist veneer—so that Cunningham’s Mrs.
Dalloway can both incorporate and displace hers. What could have been a
rethinking of what “thinking back through our mothers if we are women”
might mean if “we” are (gay) men, an exploration of the identifications
and anxieties produced by queer cultural politics’ feminist precursors,
becomes instead a repetition of Oedipus as matricide, inflected by the
cannibalistic energies unleashed by the maternal body, especially one
whose potency (who is afraid of Virginia Woolf?) has long been
acknowledged. That Cunningham has rendered Woolf a mere
footnote—reviewers gently remind us to read Mrs. Dalloway after we’ve
seen his film—recalls us to the task of redrawing as well as disbanding
boundaries, not to preserve the precincts of identity politics, but to
identify the modes and motives of boundary crossings in a field of play
in which the power of the living over the dead, and of the culture
industries over the writerly text, have more than redressed the
prestige once accorded an elite modernism, a prestige for which
“Virginia Woolf” (as Brenda Silver has shown) has served as an
insistent if contested signifier.2
But how, in fact, can we define Woolf’s literary
value against what proposition three describes as “the overwhelming
forces of mass culture and commercial entertainment” without recourse
to traditional humanistic language: psychological depth, formal
complexity, verbal richness and intensity? Can we only always reproduce
the established terms of the modernism/postmodernism, high culture/mass
culture debates? Are there non-Arnoldian criteria for defending the
humanities? Here is the subject, perhaps, of another special issue.
But no issue would be as special as the one that
proposition five invites us to imagine because the question that it
poses—whether criticism and theory in the twenty-first century “may
have to explore other media of dissemination besides those of the
printed text . . . or even language as such in its prosaic, discursive
forms"—cannot, by definition, be adequately answered discursively (p.
000). Critical Inquiry, the journal, not the practice, would need to
forgo the forms of intellectual production and consumption enabled by
the printed text and take the leap from analog to digital culture.
Others could imagine this far better than I, but some of the
ingredients would seem to be the web dissemination of
computer-generated multimedia graphics with interactive properties
positioning “readers” as components in nonverbal feedback loops. Only
by association in, or in at least a collective attempt to design, what
I believe is called a distributed cognitive community could we find out
what it would mean to wire critical inquiry through the circuits of
postmodernity.
What else is to be done is far less visionary: the
creation of textual and institutional networks that try to juxtapose,
rather than to oppose, humanists and scientists, localists and
globalists, modernists and postmodernists, and that ask loyalists on
both sides to engage the language of the other. Where that fails,
journal editors and conference organizers will need to generate
frameworks that elicit responses across these divides, that promote
dialectical structures of thought, and that accommodate structures of
feeling in which mania and depression are not the unspoken causes or
consequences of ideology but the subjects of critical conversation
about the place of affect in inquiry.
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