Why
Has Critique Run out of Steam?
From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern
by Bruno Latour
Wars. So
many wars. Wars
outside and wars inside. Cultural wars, science wars, and wars against
terrorists. Wars against poverty and wars against the poor. Wars
against ignorance and wars out of ignorance. My question is simple:
Should we be at war, too, we, the scholars, the intellectuals? Is it
really our duty to add fresh ruins to fields of ruins? Is it really the
task of the humanities to add deconstruction to destructions? More
iconoclasm to iconoclasm? What has become of critical spirit? Has it
not run out of steam?
Quite simply,
my worry is that
it might not be aligned to the right target. To remain in the
metaphorical atmosphere of the time, military experts constantly revise
their strategic doctrines, their contingency plans, the size,
direction, technology of their projectiles, of their smart bombs, of
their missiles: I wonder why we, we alone, would be saved from those
sort of revisions. It does not seem to me that we have been as quick,
in academe, to prepare ourselves for new threats, new dangers, new
tasks, new targets. Are we not like those mechanical toys that
endlessly continue to do the same gesture when everything else has
changed around them? Would it not be rather terrible if we were still
training young kids–yes, young recruits, young cadets–for wars that
cannot be thought, for fighting enemies long gone, for conquering
territories that no longer exist and leaving them ill-equipped in the
face of threats we have not anticipated, for which we are so thoroughly
disarmed? Generals have always been accused of being on the ready one
war late–especially French generals, especially these days; what would
be so surprising, after all, if intellectuals were also one war late,
one critique late–especially French intellectuals, especially now? It
has been a long time, after all, since intellectuals have stopped being
in the vanguard of things to come. Indeed, it has been a long time now
since the very notion of the avant-garde–the proletariat, the
artistic–has passed away, has been pushed aside by other forces, moved
to the rear guard, or may be lumped with the baggage train.1
We are still able to go through the motions of a critical avant-garde,
but is not the spirit gone?
In this most
depressing of
times, these are some of the issues I want to press not to depress the
reader but to press ahead, to redirect our meager capacities as fast as
possible. To prove my point, I have not exactly facts rather tiny cues,
nagging doubts, disturbing telltale signs. What has become of critique,
I wonder, when the New York Times runs the following story?
Most
scientists believe that [global] warming is caused largely by manmade
pollutants that require strict regulation. Mr. Luntz [a lobbyist for
the Republicans] seems to acknowledge as much when he says that "the
scientific debate is closing against us." His advice, however, is to
emphasize that the evidence is not complete. "Should the public come to
believe that the scientific issues are settled," he writes, "their
views about global warming will change accordingly. Therefore, you need
to continue to make the lack of scientific certainty a primary
issue."2
Fancy that? An
artificially maintained scientific controversy to favor a "brown
backlash" as Paul Ehrlich would say.3
Do
you see why
I am worried? I myself have spent sometimes in the past
trying to show the "lack of scientific certainty" inherent in the
construction of facts. I too made it a "primary issue." But I did not
exactly aim at fooling the public by obscuring the certainty of a
closed argument–or did I? After all, I have been accused of just that
sin. Still, I'd like to believe that, on the contrary, I intended to emancipate
the public from a prematurely naturalized objectified fact. Was I
foolishly mistaken? Have things changed so fast?
In which case
the danger would
no longer be coming from an excessive confidence in ideological
arguments posturing as matters of fact–as we have learned to combat so
efficiently in the past–but from an excessive distrust of good
matters of fact disguised as bad ideological biases! While we spent
years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden behind the appearance
of objective statements, do we have now to reveal the real objective
and incontrovertible facts hidden behind the illusion of
prejudices? And yet entire Ph.D programs are still running to make sure
that good American kids are learning the hard way that facts are made
up, that there is no such thing as natural, unmediated, unbiased access
to truth, that we are always the prisoner of language, that we always
speak from one standpoint, and so on, while dangerous extremists are
using the very same argument of social construction to destroy hard-won
evidence that could save our lives. Was I wrong to participate in the
invention of this field known as science studies? Is it enough to say
that we did not really mean what we meant? Why does it burn my tongue
to say that global warming is a fact whether you like it or not? Why
can't I simply say that the argument is closed for good?
Should I
reassure myself by
simply saying that bad guys can use any weapon at hand, naturalized
facts when it suits them and social construction when it suits them?
Should we apologize for having been wrong all along? Should we rather
bring the sword of criticism to criticism itself and do a bit of
soul-searching here: What were we really after when we were so intent
on showing the social construction of scientific facts? Nothing
guarantees, after all, that we should be right all the time. There is
no sure ground even for criticism.4
Is this not what criticism intended to say: that there is no sure
ground anyway? But what does it mean, when this lack of sure ground is
taken out from us by the worst possible fellows as an argument against
things we cherished?
Artificially
maintained
controversies are not the only worrying sign. What has critique become
when a French general, no, a marshal of critique, namely, Jean
Baudrillard, claims in a published book that the World Trade Towers
destroyed themselves under their own weight, so to speak, undermined by
the utter nihilism inherent in capitalism itself–as if the terrorist
planes were pulled to suicide by the powerful attraction of this black
hole of nothingness?5
What has become of critique when a book can be a best-seller that
claims that no plane ever crashed into the Pentagon? I am ashamed to
say that the author was French too.6
Remember the good old days when revisionism arrived very late, after
the facts had been thoroughly established, decades after bodies of
evidence had accumulated? Now we have the benefit of what can be called
instant revisionism? The smoke of the event has not yet finished
settling before dozens of conspiracy theories are already revising the
official account, adding even more ruins to the ruins, adding even more
smoke to the smoke. What has become of critique when my neighbor in the
little Bourbonnais village where I have my house looks down on me as
someone hopelessly naive because I believe that the United States had
been struck by terrorist attacks? Remember the good old days when
university professors could look down on unsophisticated folks because
those hillbillies naively believed in church, motherhood, and apple
pies? Well, things have changed a lot, in my village at least. I am the
one now who naively believes in some facts because I am educated, while
it is the other guys now who are too unsophisticated to be gullible
anymore: "Where have you been? Don't you know for sure that the Mossad
and the CIA did it?" What has become of critique when someone as
eminent as Stanley Fish, the "enemy of promise" as Lindsay Waters calls
him, believes he defends science studies, my field, by comparing the
law of physics to the rules of baseball?7
What has become of critique when there is a whole industry denying that
the Apollo program landed on the Moon? What has become of critique when
DARPA uses for its Total Information Awareness project the Baconian
slogan Scientia est potentia? Have I not read that somewhere in Michel
Foucault? Has Knowledge-slash-Power been co-opted of late by the
National Security Agency? Has Discipline and Punish become the
bedside reading of Mr. Ridge?
Let me be mean
for a second:
what's the real difference between conspiracists and a popularized,
that is a teachable, version of social critique inspired for instance
by a too-quick reading of, let's say, a sociologist as eminent as
Pierre Bourdieu–to be polite I will stick with the French field
commanders? In both cases, you have to learn to become suspicious of
everything people say because "of course we all know" that they live in
the thralls of a complete illusio on their real motives. Then, after
disbelief has struck and an explanation is requested for what is
"really" going on, in both cases again, it is the same appeal to
powerful agents hidden in the dark acting always consistently,
continuously, relentlessly. Of course, we, in the academy, like to use
more elevated causes–society, discourse, knowledge-slash-power, fields
of forces, empires, capitalism–while conspiracists like to portray a
miserable bunch of greedy people with dark intents, but I find
something troublingly similar in the structure of the explanation, in
the first movement of disbelief and, then, in the wheeling of causal
explanations coming out of the deep Dark below. What if explanations
resorting automatically to power, society, discourse, had outlived
their usefulness, and deteriorated to the point of now feeding also the
most gullible sort of critiques?8
Maybe I am taking conspiracy theories too seriously, but I am worried
to detect, in those mad mixtures of knee-jerk disbelief, punctilious
demands for proofs, and free use of powerful explanation from the
social neverland, many of the weapons of social critique. Of course
conspiracy theories are an absurd deformation of our own arguments,
but, like weapons smuggled through a fuzzy border to the wrong party,
these are our weapons nonetheless. In spite of all the deformations, it
is easy to recognize, still burnt in the steel, our trade mark: MADE IN
CRITICALLAND.
There
is a better way [than passing a law that restricts business], which is
to keep fighting on merit. There is no scientific consensus that
greenhouse gases cause the world's modest global warming trend, much
less whether that warming will do more harm than good, or whether we
can even do anything about it. Once Republicans concede that greenhouse
gases must be controlled, it will only be a matter of time before they
end up endorsing more economically damaging regulation. They could
always stand on principle and attempt to educated the public instead. [Wall
Street Journal, 8 Apr. 2003]
And the same
publication complains about the "pathological relation" of the "Arab
street" with truth!
3. See Paul R. and Anne H.
Ehrlich, Betrayal
of Science and Reason: How Anti-Environmental Rhetoric Threatens Our
Future (Washington, D.C., 1997).
4. The metaphor of
shifting sand
was used by
neomodernists in their critique of science studies; see A House
Built on Sand: Exposing Postmodernist Myths about Science,
ed. Noretta Koergte (Oxford, 1998), but the problem is that the authors
of this book looked backward to reenter the solid rock castle of
modernism and not forward to what I call, for lack of a better term,
nonmodernism.
5. See Jean Baudrillard, The
Spirit of
Terrorism: And Requiem for the Twin Towers (New York, 2002).
6. See Thierry Meyssan, 11
Septembre 2001:
L'effroyable imposture, translated as 911: The Big Lie
(London, 2002). Conspiracy theories have always existed, what is new in
instant revisionism is how much scientific proof they claim to imitate.
7. See Lindsay
Waters, Enemy
of Promises,
forthcoming.
8.
Their serious as well as their popularized versions have the defect of
using society as an already existing cause instead of as a possible
consequence. This was the critique that Gabriel Tarde always made
against Durkheim. It is probably the whole notion of "social" and
"society" which is responsible for the weakening of critique. I have
tried to show that in Latour, "Gabriel Tarde and the End of the
Social," in The Social in Question: New Bearings in the History and
the Social Sciences, ed. Patrick Joyce (London, 2002), pp. 117—32.
|